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PECULIARITIES OF CORRUPTION COMBATING 
IN AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE IN CONDITIONS 
OF MODERN SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITIES
The article emphasizes that corruption in Ukraine during the years o f independence 
turned into a multifaceted systemic phenomenon with devastating consequences, which 
led to the institutionalization o f corruption relations, the formation o f informal destructive 
institutions, which prolonged the practice o f clans in political and many other spheres o f 
the society which lives by double standards. The author analyzes and evaluates some o f  
the anti-corruption measures taken by the authorities for the recent time and concludes 
that they have an imitative character.
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Problem  setting. In the beginning o f the year 2020, one more scandal erupted 
in Ukraine over the high salaries and N ew  Year’s bonuses o f the governmental 
officials. The Prime M inister O. Goncharuk explained that by raising the salaries 
o f high-ranking officials the government can overcome corrupt practices in power. 
In doing so, he admitted that previous officials o f all levels, for almost three decades 
o f our state’s existence, shamelessly and unpunishedly «used to steal tens and 
hundreds o f millions o f dollars in shadow schemes» [1], transferring budget money 
to their personal accounts and deceiving the Ukrainian people. At the same time, 
representatives o f the clan-oligarchic system, which strengthened even further after 
the latest elections, have remained on top o f the domestic political beau monde and 
continue to ’root’ in various institutions o f power, through the placement o f their 
relatives, matchmakers, god relatives, etc. in governing positions with appropriate 
funding. B ut to date, no inform ation has been received by the society about 
punishing ’predecessors’ for official abuses and illegal enrichment, which every 
day looses the hope and waits for justice.
Consequently, that in order that new ministers, People’s Deputies and so-called 
top m anagers are not to be tem pted to abuse their official position (which is
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a privilege in itself) and are responsible for perform ing the ir functions, the 
governmental officials should be given a decent (!) salary, which, according to the 
form er Vice-Prim e M inister o f Ukraine Pavlo Rozenko, has increased for top 
officials by an average o f 3.5-5 times and 2.5 times for the People’s Deputies of 
Ukraine, that is, will exceed 100000 hryvnias (since January 1, 2020) [2]. Although 
the Speaker o f the Parliament Dmitryi Razumkov denied the latest information, 
saying that the salary o f «the people’s servants» will be increased only by 3 thousand 
UAH, which is connected with the cost o f living, which since January 1, 2020, 
according to the Law «On the State Budget o f Ukraine for 2020 year», will amount 
to one person to 2027 UAH, and by the end o f the year should rise to 2189 UAH.
The question is: why not to raise the wages and salaries of all working taxpayers, 
whose money fills the state budget and holds the huge state apparatus, not to mention 
pensioners and other layers o f the population who need social support from the 
state? M ay be doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers, m ilitary officers, police 
officers, firefighters, builders, miners, farmers, or any other employee from a variety 
o f industries can also start irresponsibly taking on their responsibilities, taking 
bribes or stealing what one can steal in order to be given a «decent salary on which 
one can normally live», if  to follow the logic o f the Prime M inister o f Ukraine?
With the onset o f the «fight» against corruption in power before the New 2020 
year, «in the regions, people were massively reduced with additional payments and 
allowances due to the banal reason o f lack o f funds. This is applied, in particular, 
to petty officials in district administrations, teachers and doctors» [3]. At the same 
time, the Cabinet o f M inisters repealed the previous governm ent’s decision to 
increase salaries in the sphere o f education by 20%  in 2020 due to lack o f adequate 
financial support. At the same time, in the interview to Interfax-Ukraine, Education 
M inister Anna Novosad cynically and offensively for the Ukrainian educators and 
scholars stated that her monthy salary of 36 000 UAH will not be enough for raising 
a baby if  she wants to give birth to it or for any savings, except for running costs 
[4]. At the same time, according to the State Statistics Service, during January- 
August 2019, the average salary in the sphere o f education was one o f the lowest -  
7909 UAH [5]. And all these is despite the fact that many school teachers, who are 
mostly women, have real, not dreamy children, who need to be fed, dressed, taught, 
treated, etc. Tens o f thousands o f scientific and pedagogical staff o f the country 
with the salaries o f 4 ,5-6  times less than Ms. Novosad has, do not only have a car 
but also their own housing, experiencing every day psycho-emotional load during 
an unregulated working day and having a huge degree o f responsibility for their 
work, no less than the Minister of Education has. It proves the proverb: «To someone 
the soup is liquid but to someone the pearls are small».
Thus, the fight against corruption in the government in our country began with 
the end o f the «poverty era» for the government, to improve the financial situation
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o f which there were millions o f hryvnias in the budget, and with the increased 
tension in the society, which found itself in conditions o f some more challenges 
organized by a team of so-called unsystematic politicians who, like their predecessors, 
instead o f actions required by the country as a whole, ignoring the needs o f the 
Ukrainian people, use the State for their own whims. Thus, the activities o f state 
authorities in the field o f combating corruption do not meet the demands o f society 
and are imitative. The anti-corruption measures initiated by the authorities appear 
to be another profanity, which only reinforces the problem of a certain discrepancy 
between declaring by civil servants and officials their intentions and the real state 
o f affairs in the fight against corruption. That is why, the issues o f fighting and 
overcoming corruption in the authorities do not lose their relevance in the current 
socio-political realities.
Analysis o f  recent research a nd  publications. The issues o f preventing and 
combating corruption in public authorities do not cease to arouse a lively interest 
in foreign (I. Amundsen, P. Bardhan, A. M. Barra, M. Bec, M. Beenstock, J. Gerring, 
A. W. Horowitz, E. Dabla-Noris, M. Johnston, V. T. Levin, F. T. Lui, P. Mauro, 
F. M endes, S. Rose-Ackerman, D. Serra, S. C. Thacker, J. Tirole, J. E. Foster, 
Carl J. Friedrich, A. J. Heidenheimer, L. Wilde, S. Huntington, P. Chander, etc.) 
[6-21] and domestic (L. V  Andrushchenko, Y  V. Bokovykova, A. V  Borovyk,
O. I Vasilyieva, E. V  Vdovichenko, A. V! Voloshenko, V. G. Gornyk, V. S. Zhuravsky, 
D. V. Kostenko, S. O. Kravchenko, V. I. Litvinenko, M. I. Melnyk, D. G. Mikhailenko, 
M. I. M ikhalchenko, O. M. M ikhalchenko, E. V. Nevmerzhitskyi, V. V. Nonyk, 
A. I. Pogorelova, E. V. Rasyuk, O. V. Shkuropat, S. B. Yakovenko and others) 
[22-39] experts who devoted their works to the analysis o f various aspects o f the 
investigated problems. At the same time, a number of key issues for anti-corruption 
activities, such as the features o f preventing and counteracting corruption in power 
in the current socio-political realities in Ukraine, remain not enough investigated. 
It is unfortunate that most o f the constructive proposals for solving the problem of 
corruption in our country, which were created by the scientists on the basis o f 
various researches, were discussed and corrected on numerous scientific-practical 
events and in the media; even the current normative base (over 100 legal normative 
acts: Decrees o f the President o f Ukraine, Resolutions o f the Verkhovna Rada, the 
Cabinet o f M inisters o f Ukraine and sectoral normative acts o f anti-corruption 
orientation), the Ukrainian politicum simply ignores.
Form ulation o f  goals. The purpose o f the article is to analyze the peculiarities 
o f the fight against corruption in the domestic socio-political space and to find the 
mechanisms for preventing and counteracting corruption in power in Ukraine in 
accordance with contemporary realities.
Presenting main material. Corruption, as an attributive phenomenon of power 
and monetary relations in a society that appeared with the state apparatus several
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millennia ago by a caste of governmental people who quickly saw the possibility of 
using state power for personal gainful purposes [39, p. 59], mainly for their own 
enrichment, has gradually become an element o f everyday life in practically every 
country. With its evolution, corruption, like an octopus, seized all spheres of social 
life, acquired many forms, manifestations and features, in various ways damaging the 
life of a man, society and the state, transforming into a modern world into a complex, 
systematic, multifaceted phenomenon with devastating consequences, destructive 
consequences, that «are constantly multiplied and difficult to calculate» [40].
International rankings show that corruption has sporadic m anifestations in 
civilized and economically developed countries, because in democratic states there 
are real institutions of counterbalancing that hold the people in office off from abuse 
and related opportunities to gain illicit benefits, and a real opportunity to identify 
and punish high-ranking crim inals [6, p. 10]. In Ukraine, during the years of 
independence, corruption has become widespread and has actually displaced the 
state as an imperative (determining) subject o f power, appropriating and deforming 
fundamentally important social attributes [27, p. 27-28]. In turn, the weakening of 
state control and the imperfection o f the legislation have influenced the progressive 
and intensive growth of the number and types of corruption offenses, the general 
decrease in the spiritual and moral potential o f society, the rule o f legal nihilism in 
it, the lack o f faith in the inevitability o f punishment [41].
Although practically all types o f states declare the fight against corruption, any 
attempts to completely eradicate this destructive phenomenon within a particular 
country during a certain period of its development have not had long-lasting positive 
results, except that a temporary decrease in the manifestations o f corrupt practices 
in certain spheres of life with the maintaining constant scrutiny to ensure that the 
level o f corruption in the country remains minimal. Thus, according to an analysis 
o f the results o f the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2019, which is calculated by 
Transparency International since 1995, New Zealand and Denmark, which scored 
87 out o f 100, are among the 180 countries with the least corruption. Somalia (9), 
South Sudan (12) and Syria (13) are at the end o f the list, where for a long time 
there is an unstable political situation, military conflicts, governments only partially 
control the territory, that is, corruption actually replaces the state. Ukraine ranks 
126th in this ranking, losing its position, compared to the previous year, by 2 points
[42]. So, while humankind is seeking the mechanisms and instruments of eradicating 
corruption that are relevant to contemporary realities, the leaders of states that are 
determined to eradicate this dangerous negative social phenomenon can use their 
experience and anticorruption expertise to get into «the club o f less corrupt 
countries», who are considered prosperous.
The results o f the fight against corruption are influenced by a number o f factors, 
including a historical period characterized by appropriate means o f influencing
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corruption; geographical localization o f the region to which the state belongs; 
institutional features o f the state system; level o f economic development and w ell­
being o f citizens; cultural, religious, historical traditions, etc. [24, p. 230]. But, 
considering all these factors combined, in combination with the rightly chosen 
measures (from purely repressive to preventive ones), it is difficult to hope during 
their implementation to succeed without the political will o f the country’s leaders, 
the unceasingly controlled application o f a w ide range o f state anti-corruption 
regulatory imperatives (basic principles, decrees, instructions, orders, etc.), public 
support and activity of citizens interested in overcoming this dangerous phenomenon.
The society, understanding the destructive consequences o f corruption, which 
negatively affect all aspects o f the socio-economic and political development of 
the state, threaten the implementation o f the principles o f the rule o f law and social 
justice, lead to the destruction o f the foundations o f law and order and sharply 
weaken all public institutions, reduce public confidence in power, lead society to 
its degradation, forming «double standards» o f the members o f society with morals 
and behavior, undermine the foundations o f democracy and violate human rights, 
cause serious damage to U kraine’s image and prestige in the international arena, 
etc., does not reject the hope o f finding appropriate mechanisms and tools, if  not 
to reduce corruption to a minimum, at least to create an atmosphere o f aversion to 
any corruption manifestations and relations.
Remaining in the group o f countries trying to fight corruption, Ukraine seeks 
to follow the recommendations o f Transparency International to reduce corruption 
influence on public relations, especially since after the victory o f the Revolution of 
Dignity the preconditions for the country’s elimination o f corruption were created. 
However, in 2019, the Ukrainian state implemented or partially implemented only 
6 o f the 12 recommendations provided by Transparency International Ukraine that 
could improve our country’s CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index). The government 
ignored most o f the recommendations and brought the fight against corruption to 
naught. U kraine’s political elite continue to resist the anti-corruption movement of 
civil society. Its newly elected representatives lack not only the relevant knowledge, 
skills and experience of public administration, but also the political will and courage 
to move forward, and not to preserve the situation, covering by noisy public anti­
corruption rhetoric and incomprehensible and unacceptable tools in society.
The individual actions o f the Ukrainian authorities, which use discretion (at 
their discretion) as the main way o f governing the state, in interpreting any law or 
decision proposed by it, no longer cause the excitement o f the majority o f Ukrainian 
citizens. Thus, in January 2020, Ukrainians experienced another shock when they 
learned about the huge monthly salaries received by high-ranking officials and some 
other persons empowered to perform state functions (from the lowest -  UAH 32 
386 th o u san d  rece iv ed  by the  M in is te r  o f  the  C ab in e t o f  M in is te rs  o f
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U kraine D. D ubiletto  up to  U A H  1,9 m illion from  the D irecto r General o f 
«Ukrposhta» Smilyanskyi I. Y., and this is without any allowances, financial aid, 
bonuses o f 200-400% , etc. o f payments from the state budget) compared to the 
average salary in the country (in December 2019 it amounted to 12264 UAH). At 
the same time, two draft laws (No 2720 and No 2720-1) were submitted by the 
Cabinet o f Ministers to the Parliament for consideration o f proposing not to link 
the minimum wage in the budgetary sphere with the cost o f living (about UAH 
2,000) but to form it annually, separately «taking into account the financial capacity 
o f the state and local budgets», each time stating in the budget. That is, taking care 
o f «ensuring the rights and interests o f economic entities, citizens and the state»
[43], the authorities, using the anomalies o f «permitting» and regulatory functions 
of public administration, actually allow to set a minimum wage below the subsistence 
minimum to the state employees, which, in experts’ opinion, is a gross violation of 
the right o f citizens to equal pay for equal work for employees o f the budgetary 
and extra-budgetary sectors and can lead to discrimination in the workplace, without 
even mentioning a significant financial state deterioration o f these.
Can such actions o f the authorities be described as different from corruption 
when high-ranking officials empowered to exercise public functions who exercise 
discretionary power -  the power over the distribution o f certain resources that do 
not belong to them, distribute them at their discretion [35, p. 41] «to whom pies 
and pancakes, to whom hum and bruises»? At first glance, everything is legal, 
transparent and accountable: they have informed the public about the over-amounted 
salaries and bonuses of the people in power, who have made declarations of property 
available, and after a negative evaluation o f the inform ation received from the 
citizens, have acted as a whole front in defense o f improving their financial situation.
Undoubtedly, informing society through mass media about property and income 
of the power holders and electronic declaration o f persons authorized to perform 
the functions o f the state or local self-government in the Unified State Register of 
Declarations opened the possibility for anti-corruption bodies to control and expose 
cases o f corruption and bribery. It was not even possible to imagine such a thing 
before the Maidan period, though the media reported about the luxurious life of 
representatives o f the political elite and their families at the expense o f the state, 
which angered the public, but no measures were taken to outright corrupt officials.
Thus, if  the European practice o f high-ranking officials reporting to the people 
on income is entrenched and the declarants are held criminally responsible for the 
assets and property the origin o f which do not correspond to their earnings, such 
measures can be considered as one o f the important anti-corruption mechanisms, 
which plays a preventive role and is an effective instrument o f exposing persons in 
power involved in this type o f offenses. At the same time, it is important that anti­
corruption activities are not selective and concern officials o f all levels, including
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the highest and especially those suspected of corruption, which will help restore 
public confidence in the state and its representatives.
A lthough the overwhelm ing majority (72% ) is positive or overwhelmingly 
positive about the opening o f property declarations by the top society and the 
transparency it guarantees, 33%  of Ukrainians doubt that e-declarations contain 
full information about public servants’ salaries, considering that their real status of 
their incom e has little to do w ith the figures given in the official documents. 
Moreover, with the help o f the Internet and the media, and in some cases directly, 
citizens have the opportunity to observe daily that some high-ranking officials 
continue to use their official position and authority primarily to obtain unjustified 
benefits and personal enrichment. According to the skeptical part o f the population, 
the declarants disclose only the property that, as they think, can be verified, or 
consider the e-declaration procedure purely a formality, and therefore declare 
a minimal amount o f property [44].
The perception o f corruption by the population as one o f the fast and relatively 
simple ways o f solving problems, the achievement o f the desired result, has created 
a «habit» in society for this phenomenon. Corruption has become the style and way 
o f life o f a very large circle o f people, driven by the state o f economic and political 
development o f the country, national mentality and the circumstances under which 
the vast m ajority o f the population, grew  under conditions w here corruption 
relations have become a social norm and corruption behavior has been justified [8, 
p. 862]. The integration o f corruption practices into culture and the lack o f public 
condemnation o f meeting those needs that have been left out o f formal procedures 
have contributed to the widespread spread of «grassroots», «household» corruption 
[19, p. 362-363], which, in turn, has led to spread o f systemic corruption in society 
and shaping it as a «norm of life» rather than an anomaly. Therefore, when civil 
servants use their powers for private gain (such as getting a valuable gift for 
arranging someone for a prestigious job or even arranging a «better» table at 
a restaurant than other clients have because o f their position or status), such actions 
are not called «corrupt» or «illegal», just perhaps immoral ones [7, p. 1321].
Although such actions do not carry social dangers such as bribery, organized 
and econom ic crime, etc., their deep penetration into the sphere o f everyday 
relationships and daily life o f the society is a powerful factor in demoralization of 
society, devaluation  o f m oral values, deform ation o f individual and social 
psychology; destruction o f spiritual and moral values; prom otion o f criminal 
psychology in the society; changes in the m otivation of the officials in public 
adm inistration, as well as citizens in various spheres o f social life [32, p. 52]. 
Corruption poses an important danger in those areas on which daily life depends 
directly -  ensuring public safety, health care, education, housing and communal 
services, etc. [37, p. 109]. The negligence and inactivity o f the bureaucracy in these
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areas undermines public confidence in public authorities and respect for the law, 
promotes the penetration o f the criminal component in public administration and 
public relations.
That is why, in the current socio-political realities in Ukraine, including the 
continuation o f the war in the east o f Ukraine and the annexation o f Crimea, mass 
impoverishment of the great number o f the population; constant rise in prices for 
food, medicine, tariffs for housing and communal services and transport services; 
low incomes o f the country’s residents (salaries, pensions and social benefits); 
continuous outflow o f people, mostly young people, to work abroad, lack o f proper 
level o f social and legal security o f the society and many other problems that have 
not been solved by the authorities for decades, it is very difficult for ordinary citizens 
to trust officials, who, justifying their assets and salaries of tens and sometimes even 
in the hundreds of thousands of hryvnias a month, when they say, «that it is impossible 
to have a fair and effective state until the officials receive a meager salary»?
And is it possible to have a healthy and educated nation if  health workers and 
educators have wages and salaries below the national average? Can someone expect 
efficient and responsible work from anyone whose salaries will not meet the basic 
needs o f their families, not to m ention dangerous and uncom fortable working 
conditions, old, barely working equipment, etc.? And are high salaries o f civil 
servants not a temptation for those who are only interested in money and not in the 
public good?
Global experience shows that corruption reduction does not necessarily follow 
wages raise. In India, for example, in 1997, the customs officers doubled their 
salaries, but they continued to take bribes because corruption rents were too high 
to refuse from additional source o f income [45]. Moreover, high salaries can serve 
as another cover for corrupt people who lead a luxurious lifestyle. As the ex-People’s 
Deputee from the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction Oleg Petrenko says, explaining 
such not small official salaries o f the representatives o f «the Servant o f People» by 
the fact that they need to cover the stolen, because elementary comparison o f the 
ministers’ way o f life with the official salaries will never pass the check from any 
anti-corruption structure. Therefore, they calculated them selves hundreds o f 
thousands, millions o f hryvnias, and then, when inspected, to show why they lead 
such a lifestyle [46].
Thus, to recognize as successful the use o f such an instrument to counteract 
corruption practices in power, as raising the already high salaries o f the powerful, 
is impossible, since obtaining them benefits in the form o f money contrary to the 
legitimate interests o f society and the state, which are in difficult conditions o f 
functioning, has rather signs corruption manifestations, not counteracting them.
The complexity o f overcoming corruption in Ukraine with the help o f relevant 
to modern realities mechanisms and tools is that the corruption environment has
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a high capacity for self-organization and sustainable self-preservation, forming 
a «root system» that germinates and takes roots at «all levels of public administration 
from higher authorities to regional and district state administrations, law enforcement 
agencies and courts, the army, financial and economic, educational, medical and 
many other spheres o f life o f societies» [47, p. 189], adapting to certain objective 
circumstances and manifesting itself in various destructive forms, such as nepotism, 
nepotism, cronyism, patrimonialism, clientism, favoritism, etc.
Such diversity o f manifestations o f corruption in the domestic socio-political 
space contributed to the establishment and approval o f clan-caste practice o f state 
power, and under such circumstances to all important positions it appoints people 
who focus not on the interests o f the majority o f the population o f the country, the 
public good and the achievement o f these socially significant values, but on the 
internal corporate standards o f personal devotion to the first person or his closest 
associates [48, p. 14]. There is a peculiar ’seizure’ o f the state through the unfair 
distribution o f positions in the authorities, according to which preferences for 
obtaining a certain place are given on the basis o f the closeness o f relations (relatives, 
friends, party members), but not on the degree o f professionalism, qualification, 
experience and competence o f the candidates. Individuals appointed to the influential 
positions interact with their patron and form «the rules o f the game» with him. 
Under these rules, an informal policy is pursued, in which the interests o f the 
dominant group take priority over the interests o f the public.
There is an institutionalization of numerous forms o f corruption that are «rooted» 
in the already established and traditional network o f political entities o f Ukrainian 
society. Informal institutions (such as nepotism institution, institution o f cronyism, 
or institutions o f protectionism, «codes o f honor», bribery, etc.), whose existence 
and activity are not regulated by law, make a real, mostly destructive influence on 
the functioning o f social subsystems, they are not inferior to social institutions and 
becom e a source o f inertia and fuel corruption in power. Despite the growing 
democracy and openness o f U kraine’s political system, political processes in our 
country are governed by family-clan groupings through traditional norms adopted 
in society, rather than formal legislation [49, p. 16].
Ukrainian society hoped that V. Zelenskyi, who during the presidential campaign 
sharply criticized P. Poroshenko for his friends, god relatives, business partners, 
who «steered» politics and the economy o f the state, would stop the practice o f clan 
politics in all its manifestations. This could help to reduce the destructive influence 
o f corrupt networks in power on the functioning o f the state and society. However, 
winning the election, the newly elected president brought to power former partners 
in the «Quartal 95» studio and his childhood friends. These appointments are traced 
in the private, interpersonal relations o f friendship and partnership, which is quite 
understandable, because these are friends, one can trust in, especially when you go
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from the variety stage to the political stage. M oreover, the country lacks legal 
regulation of employment relations at the state, municipal and other services, as 
well as criteria for assessing the professionalism o f a candidate for a certain position. 
That is why, Mr. Zelenskyi granted his «people» preferences by appointing them 
or, on the recom m endation o f certain persons, to  high public positions w ith 
corresponding high salaries (for example, S. Sheriff was appointed First Assistant 
to the President, I. B akanov -  the H ead o f the Security Service o f U kraine, 
S. Trofimov and Y  Kostyuk -  the Deputy Heads o f the Presidential Administration, 
etc.). In doing so, Mr. President has broken all his promises as for the appointment 
o f friends, god relatives and business partners.
By such actions V. Zelenskyi prom oted the rooted functioning o f informal 
destructive institutions in the sphere of public administration (political cronyism, 
clientism, patronage, nepotism, etc.) functioning in our country, as components of 
corruption, which contributes to the clan-based and behind-the-scenes decision­
making at the state level in the interest of only a small group of people who are 
connected by friends or family relations. The officials’ ineffective decisions, such 
as raising their salaries against the background o f all the troubles in the country and 
impoverishing the most of the population is a confirmation o f keeping the corruption 
component in power. Such actions by the authorities have repeatedly provoked 
conflicts in the socio-political and administrative spheres of society, which has 
negatively affected the anti-corruption reputation of both V. Zelenskyi and his party 
m em bers and appointees to  various h igh-ranking governm ent positions and 
increased public distrust in the government.
Thus, the peculiarity o f the started fight against corruption practice in the power 
in U kraine in the current realities is that in the domestic socio-political space 
corruption has become a complex, systematic, multidimensional phenomenon and 
there has been institutionalization of numerous forms of corruption into informal 
destructive institutions with the destructive consequences on the life of a man, 
society and the state. The inconsistent and contradictory personnel policy of the 
current President and his closest environment cemented the practice o f clan politics 
in all its manifestations, keeping the state structures as the source base o f the clan- 
oligarchic system of Ukraine.
Another feature of the anti-corruption struggle in the domestic socio-political 
space is that it does not have sufficient support from the vast majority of the population 
due to the fact that the level of political and legal culture of society does not correspond 
to the achieved level of formal democracy. W hile citizens condemn high-level 
corruption, there is low resistance to corruption in the public consciousness, and 
corruption behaviors and actions left outside the formal procedures are justified, as 
corruption has become a social norm. The government failed to establish cooperation 
with civil society on preventing and combating corruption in Ukraine, participation 
of citizens in public administration, as well as supervision over the transparency of
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funding of political entities remain minimal. The control by the state and the public 
over the official behavior of the politicum regarding the use of corruption practices 
by the officials in the form of various forms of corruption is formal.
Conclusions. In today’s socio-political realities, rapid positive developments 
in the fight against corruption in government are unlikely to be expected, since all 
state structures and bodies are the main carriers of this destructive phenomenon, 
a source of its support and spreading through the network of corruption links and 
relations in the spheres of life in the country (political, law enforcement, judicial, 
financial and economic, scientific, educational, medical, cultural and informational, 
etc.), in each of which powerful clans were formed, which seems unrealistic to 
destroy them.
At the same time, the society does not lose hope for active anti-corruption 
measures by the state, which should control the activity of the state apparatus and 
respond promptly to any corruption manifestations. Moreover, for this activity there 
is a domestic anti-corruption legal framework, a draft Anti-corruption strategy for 
2019-2023, experience in successfully combating corruption in European countries, 
scientific developments on mechanisms for preventing and combating corruption. 
The most active members of civil society are objectively interested in contributing, 
together with anti-corruption agencies, public associations and the media, to 
eradicating corruption in all spheres of public life, to change the public’s perceptions 
of corrupt acts and justification of corruption practice, to promote the establishment 
of a public atmosphere of complete rejection of corruption and its recognition as 
a socially dangerous and destructive phenomenon for the individual, society and 
the state. Therefore, in the current socio-political realities, in order to counteraction 
corruption in Ukraine, it is necessary to move from the permanent attempts to fight 
corruption to full-scale systemic measures in order to achieve this goal.
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о с о б е н н о с т и  б о р ь б ы  с  к о р р у п ц и е й  в о  в л а с т и  
у к р а и н ы  в  у с л о в и я х  с о в р е м е н н ы х  с о ц и а л ь н о ­
п о л и т и ч е с к и х  р е а л и й
В статье подчеркивается, что в Украине за годы независимости коррупция 
превратилась в многоаспектное системное явление с разрушительными послед­
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ствиями, что обусловило институционализию коррупционных отношений, образо­
вание неформальных деструктивных институтов, которые продлили практику 
клановости в политической и многих других сферах жизнедеятельности общества, 
живущего по двойным стандартам. Автор анализирует и дает оценку некоторым 
антикоррупционным мероприятиям, проведенным властью в последнее время и де­
лает вывод об их имитационном характере.
Ключевые слова: коррупция, коррупционная практика, антикоррупционные меха­
низмы, дискреционная власть, неформальные деструктивные институты политики.
Сахань Олена М иколаївна, кандидат соціологічних наук, доцент, 
доцент кафедри соціології та політології Національного юридичного 
університету імені Ярослава Мудрого, м. Харків, Україна
ОСОБЛИВОСТІ БОРОТЬБИ З КОРУПЦІЄЮ У ВЛАДІ УКРАЇНИ 
В УМОВАХ СУЧАСНИХ СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕАЛІЙ
Постановка проблеми. Антикорупційні заходи, розпочаті державними органа­
ми влади напередодні новорічних свят з 2019 на 2020р. викликали в населення Укра­
їни хвилю обурення, посилили напруженість та конфліктність у  суспільстві, нега­
тивно вплинули на антикорупційну репутацію інститутів державного управління. 
Користуючись анормальністю «дозвільних» та регулюючих функцій, влада вчинила 
дії, які виглядають як чергова профанація, що закріпило проблему певної невідповід­
ності між декларуванням державними службовцями та посадовцями своїх намірів 
і реальним станом речей щодо боротьби із корупцією. Тому питання подолання 
корупції у  владі не втрачають своєї актуальності в умовах сучасних соціально-по­
літичних реалій.
Аналіз останніх досліджень та публікацій свідчить про те, що питання запо­
бігання та протидії корупції в органах державної влади не припиняють викликати 
жвавий інтерес як у  зарубіжних (І. Амундсен, П. Бардхан, Е. М. Барр, А. В. Горовіц, 
М. Джонстон, В. Т. Левін, С. Роуз-Аккерман, С. С. Такер, А. Дж. Хайденхаймер, 
С. Гантінгтон та ін.), так і вітчизняних (Л. В. Андрущенко, А. В. Боровик, А. В. Во­
лошенко, В. С. Журавський, Д. В. Костенко, В. І. Литвиненко, М. І. Мельник, 
Є. В. Невмержицький, В. В. Нонік, О. В. Шкуропат, С. Б. Яковенко та ін.) фахівців, 
які присвятили свої роботи аналізу різних аспектів досліджуваної проблематики. 
Водночас недостатньо вивченою залишається низка ключових для антикорупційної 
діяльності питань, у  тому числі таких, як особливості запобігання та протидії 
корупції у  владі в умовах сучасних соціально-політичних реалій в Україні.
Метою статті є аналіз особливостей боротьби з корупцією у  вітчизняному 
соціально-політичному просторі та пошук відповідних сучасним реаліям механізмів 
запобігання і протидії корупційним практикам у  владі.
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Виклад основного матеріалу. Корупція в Україні за роки незалежності пере­
творилася в багатоаспектне системне явище, яке фактично витіснило державу як 
імперативний (визначальний) суб’єкт влади, привласнюючи й деформуючи принци­
пово важливі суспільні атрибути. Декларуючи свої наміри щодо боротьби з коруп­
цією, Українська держава виконала або частково виконала за 2019 р. лише 6 з 12 
рекомендацій, наданих Transparency International Ukraine, які б могли покращити 
показники нашої країни за Індексом сприйняття корупції (CPI), та посіла 126 місце 
зі 180, втративши свої позиції, порівняно з попереднім роком, на 2 бали. Це свідчить 
про імітаційний характер антикорупційної боротьби в нашій країні.
Спроби влади відновити довіру суспільства до держави та її представників 
через систему е-декларування майна та доходів можновладців не змінила ситуацію. 
Декларанти знаходять можливість декларувати мінімальну кількість майна, а На­
ціональне агентство з питань запобігання корупції займається хіба що дрібними 
питаннями, що доводить його функціональну неспроможність. Новообрані пред­
ставники політичної еліти України лише консервують ситуацію, прикриваючись 
галасливою публічною антикорупційною риторикою та незрозумілими і неприйнят­
ними в суспільстві інструментами боротьби з корупцією.
Корупція в Україні за роки незалежності перетворилася в багатоаспектне сис­
темне явище з руйнівними наслідками, що зумовило інституціоналізію корупційних 
відносин, утворення неформальних деструктивних інститутів (непотизму, кумів­
ства, кронізму, патрімоніалізму, клієнтизму тощо), які подовжили практику кла- 
новості в політичній та багатьох інших сферах життєдіяльності суспільства, яке 
живе за подвійними стандартами.
Висновки. Особливістю розпочатої боротьби з корупційною практикою у  владі 
стало те, що попри певне зростання демократичності та відкритості політичної 
системи України політичні процеси в нашій країні, як і раніше, регулюють сімейно- 
кланові угруповання за допомогою традиційних норм, прийнятих у  суспільстві, а не 
формального законодавства, залишаючи державні структури джерельною базою 
кланово-олігархічної системи України. Підтвердженням збереження корупційного 
складника у  владі стало прийняття посадовцями неефективних рішень на кшталт 
підняття собі зарплат на фоні усіх негараздів у  країні та зубожіння широких верств 
населення. Тому в умовах сучасних соціально-політичних реалій в країні для вирішен­
ня питань протидії корупції владі необхідно налагодити співпрацю з громадянським 
суспільством і незалежними засобами масової інформації та разом почати повно- 
масштабні системні антикорупційні заходи задля досягнення поставленої мети, 
спираючись на вітчизняну нормативно-правову базу, конструктивні пропозиції на­
уковців та світовий досвід країн, які мають позитивні результати в боротьбі 
з корупцією.
Ключові слова: корупція, корупційна практика, антикорупційні механізми, дис­
креційна влада, неформальні деструктивні інститути політики.
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